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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Joshua Riggins challenges the district court’s order granting the State’s motion to 
reconsider its order withdrawing his guilty plea.  He argues the district court exceeded its 
authority and denied him due process of law because it unilaterally took away his constitutional 
rights to a jury trial, to remain silent, and to confront the witnesses against him.  In response, the 
State argues that Mr. Riggins has failed to identify a constitutional violation, the error is not clear 
on the record because this is an issue of first impression, and any error is harmless because the 
district court abused its discretion by initially granting Mr. Riggins’ motion to withdraw his plea.  
The State’s arguments misconstrue both the law and facts, and are thus unavailing.   
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err by granting the State’s motion for reconsideration because the court did 
not have the authority to reinstate Mr. Riggins’ guilty plea? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Granting The State’s Motion For Reconsideration Because The 
Court Did Not Have The Authority To Reinstate Mr. Riggins’ Guilty Plea 
 
In his opening brief, Mr. Riggins challenged the district court’s authority to reconsider an 
order granting the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea under fundamental error.  (See App. 
Br., pp.5–6); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010).  He explained that, by granting the 
motion to withdraw, the court returned him to his status quo ante and “it is as if the plea had 
never been entered ab initio.”  (See App. Br., pp.5–6 (citing Williams v. State, 762 So. 2d 990, 
991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).)  Therefore, when the district court granted the State’s motion to 
reconsider, it denied Mr. Riggins due process of law by unilaterally taking away his 
constitutional rights to a jury trial, to remain silent, and to confront the witnesses against him. 
In response, the State first argues that Mr. Riggins has not shown constitutional error:   
 
[Mr.] Riggins has failed to show any constitutional prohibition on a court’s 
reconsideration of an order granting withdrawal of a guilty plea.  The only 
authority he cites, Williams v. State, 762 So.2d 990 (Fla. Ct. App. Fourth Dist., 2000) 
(cited at Appellant’s brief, pp.5–6), relies upon a Florida procedural rule. Riggins 
does not cite to, and the state is unaware of, any constitutional right implicated in, 
much less violated by, reconsideration of an order granting a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea.    
 
(Resp. Br., p.6.)  The State’s assertion that Mr. Riggins has failed to identify a constitutional 
basis for his claim is patently false.   As Mr. Riggins Appellant’s Brief makes clear, his claim 
rests on the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions.  (See App. Br., pp.5–6 (“Criminal defendants enjoy the 
right to a trial by jury, to remain silent, and to confront the witnesses against him. . . .  Allowing 
the district court to reconsider an order withdrawing a guilty plea in effect allows the district 
court to unilaterally declare the defendant’s guilt; take away his rights to a trial by jury, to remain 
silent, and to confront the witnesses against him; and in turn denies the defendant due process of 
law.”) (citing U.S. CONST. amends. V and VI; IDAHO CONST. art. I, §§ 7 and 13).)   
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 Similarly, the State’s attempt to distinguish Williams because it “relie[d] upon a Florida 
procedural rule” (Resp. Br., p.6), is curious given that Williams itself mentions no such 
procedural rule, see Williams, 762 So. 2d at 991.  The Williams Court cites to two Florida Rules 
of Criminal Procedure (“FRCP”) earlier in the opinion, neither of which has any bearing on this 
issue.  First, Williams cited to FRCP 3.172 when explaining the background of the case.  
Williams, 762 So. 2d at 991 (“The trial court found that Williams’s change of plea was voluntary 
under [FRCP] 3.172, accepted Williams’s plea of nolo contendere, and set the sentencing hearing 
for March 5, 1999.”).  Second, Williams cited to FRCP 3.170(f) when discussing the court’s 
discretionary decision to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea in the first place.  Williams, 
762 So. 2d at 991.  Neither of those rules appear relevant to this issue (which would explain why 
Williams itself did not cite to them when addressing this issue), the State has failed to actually 
identify the “Florida procedural rule” on which it claims Williams relied, and counsel has found 
no other rule to which the State could refer.    
In fact, Williams cites only to cases to support its reasoning on that point.  See id.  The 
first in the line of cases on which Williams relies, Bell v. State, 262 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1972), appears to have addressed a double jeopardy challenge and does not mention any 
rules of procedure whatsoever.   Id. at 245.  The defendant’s contention in Bell was that the 
district court erred when, after allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, it allowed the 
State to recharge him with a greater offense.  Id.  The court rejected the argument, explaining 
that “[w]hen the appellant withdrew his plea of guilty and it was accepted by the court, it was as 
if a plea had never been entered ab initio.  To hold otherwise would cause the trial courts to be 
apprehensive of accepting or allowing the withdrawal of a plea because such discretionary action 
might prevent justice from being carried out.”  Id.  The remaining cases cited by Williams—
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Miles v. State, 620 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. Ct. App. Second Dist., 1993), and State v. McClain, 509 So. 
2d 1360 (Fla. Ct. App. Second Dist., 1987)—similarly cite to the earlier cases, but not to a 
“procedural rule.”  The State’s attempt to distinguish Williams on the ground that it “relie[d] 
upon a Florida procedural rule” is baseless.  (Resp. Br., p.6.)  
 The State next claims that there was no clear error, apparently because Idaho has yet to 
decide the legal issue in this case, while other jurisdictions have gone both ways on it.  
(Resp. Br., p.6.)  The State’s argument mistakes the very meaning of clear error.  Under the 
fundamental error standard, “the error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether 
the failure to object was a tactical decision.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 226 (emphasis added).  It does 
not, as the State implies, require that the legal issue be “clear” or already decided.  State v. 
Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 221 (2014) (“This Court has not held that for fundamental error to exist, 
it is necessary for existing authorities to have unequivocally resolved the issue in appellant’s 
favor.”) (footnote regarding the Court of Appeals’ holdings to the contrary omitted).    
Finally, as for harmlessness, the State contends that Mr. Riggins had not shown 
prejudice:   
Here the district court abused its discretion when it initially granted 
[Mr. Riggins’] motion.  The sole basis for the motion was a claim of innocence, 
which is not a legal basis for allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea.  Because the 
only prejudice [Mr.] Riggins asserts is the right to retain an erroneous ruling, he 
has shown no prejudice. 
 
(Resp. Br., p.7 (emphasis added).)  As an initial matter, the State’s characterization of the facts is 
not entirely accurate.  Mr. Riggins first said that he wanted to withdraw his plea because he was 
supposed to be taking antidepressants (6/2/2014 Tr., p.5, Ls.1–25), and later said that he wanted 
to withdraw his plea because he is innocent (6/20/2014 Tr., p.5, L.21 – p.6, L.14).  The court 
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expressly considered both Mr. Riggins’ innocence and depression when granting the motion: 
Mr. Riggins, I am loathe to force a person to be sentenced when they’re 
maintaining their innocence. . . .  I did read the mental health evaluation and the 
Gain which suggest that you have been suffering from depression, that you’re on 
medication, that there are some concern[s] about your psychiatric condition, you 
were walking to talk to a psychiatrist at some point. 
Given that, I will allow you to withdraw your plea. 
 
(6/20/14 Tr., p.6, L.16 – p.7, L.11; see also R., p.134.)  Although on reconsideration the court 
stated that “there is no meaningful indication in the record that Riggins’ depression rose to a 
level that rendered his guilty plea constitutionally involuntary,” that does not change the fact that 
the court initially granted the motion on both bases.  (R., pp.163– 64; see also 8/22/14 Tr., p.4, 
L.20 – p.5, L.19); State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho 411, 414 (Ct. App. 1987) (“In granting or 
denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing has occurred, the district court is 
empowered with broad discretion, liberal exercise of which is encouraged.”) (internal citations 
omitted).  Regardless, just because a court does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion 
brought based on factual innocence alone does not mean it abuses its discretion by granting a 
motion due to factual innocence.  The State’s assertion that the error was harmless because the 
district court abused its discretion by granting the motion in the first place is factually incorrect 
and legally unsupported. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Riggins respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, 
withdraw his guilty plea, and remand to the district court for trial. 
 DATED this 22nd day of January, 2016. 
 
      _________/s/________________ 
      MAYA P. WALDRON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
 7 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of January, 2016, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in 
the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
 
JOSHUA RIGGINS 
6893 RIVER ROAD 
CLARK FORK ID 83811 
 
BARBARA BUCHANAN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
  
SERRA S WOODS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      EVAN A. SMITH 
      Administrative Assistant 
 
MPW/eas 
 
